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In Anatomy of post-communist European defense institutions: The mirage of 
military modernity, Thomas-Durell Young’s aim was to determine why Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) states have failed to apply democratic defence governance 
concepts, despite 25 years of Western assistance programmes. Young provides an in-
depth comparative analysis of the impact of Western defence reform programmes on 
CEE states, from the end of the Cold War to circa 2015, which is of great theoretical 
importance for South African defence planners. The United States (US) and other 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have been extensively 
involved in providing education, training and technical assistance as part of defence 
reform programmes for CEE states.1 In this book, CEE states cover certain former 
Soviet Union states (such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and the 
Baltic States), former Warsaw Pact countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia) as well as former Yugoslav republics.2 However, it 
excludes Albania, Belarus, Kosovo and Russia.3 The ‘three typologies’ in this book thus 
refer to former Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavian countries.
Young points out that, despite all the exposure to Western planning methods, 
training and education, as well as participation in NATO exercises and operations, 
CEE states in general have not been able to establish the ability to do proper defence 
planning, mainly due to the continued impact of legacy communist-inspired concepts.4 
To achieve the aim, Young covers five key aspects as underlying questions within each 
typology.5 Firstly, an overview is provided of the thinking and institutional capabilities 
of defence institutions in CEE states, by comparing these to democratic Western 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 48, Nr 1, 2020. doi: 10.5787/48-1-1295
116
South African Journal of Military Studies
defence concepts and practices. Secondly, the obstacles that inhibited defence reforms 
are identified. Thirdly, Western policy and methods during assistance programmes are 
critically evaluated. Fourthly, the influence of these programmes towards instilling 
democratic defence governance concepts in CEE states is assessed. Lastly, Young wants 
to determine what both Western and CEE states have to do differently in order to achieve 
more effective defence reform in CEE states – at a faster pace. 
To shed light on the unaffordability of and strategic imbalance in CEE defence 
organisations, Young explains that, within the communist model, the military enjoys 
special benefits not offered to the rest of society.6 The embedded heavy reliance on mass 
regarding troops, equipment and logistics for operational success in CEE states, inhibits 
awareness about costing in general and using resources sparingly and cost-effectively.7 
With this systematic focus on mass and quantity, the life and value of the individual 
soldier (especially under communism) are expendable, whereas in democracies, the 
individual citizen soldier forms part of democratic society, which enjoys fundamental 
freedoms and rights, including the right to vote, debate military affairs and ask questions 
about military spending. The absence of critical thinking and debate in communist 
militaries stifles renewal and innovation.8 Young argues that, since CEE states still apply 
communist legacy concepts, including rigid centralised command, their defence policy 
documents have little effect on implementation, defence outcomes and spending.9 They 
lack operational focus, cannot stay within their limited defence budgets and overspend 
on cumbersome personnel structures. This leaves them with too little operating funds 
for field exercises and maintaining prime mission equipment (e.g. fighter aircraft). 
Subsequently many CEE states have “hollow” units, low operational readiness, 
aircraft that cannot fly, pilots with insufficient flying hours, and capital projects that are 
unnecessarily delayed.10 Most CEE states are still stuck with Cold War-era equipment 
as a financial, logistic and doctrinal yoke.11 While countries like Poland, Romania and 
Slovenia have not been in constant decline regarding defence capabilities and capacity, 
all CEE states have capability gaps and serious defence planning shortcomings that have 
severely affected their ability to lead and manage defence organisations optimally.12 
Young warns that the incoherent and weak policies, strategies and capabilities of 
CEE countries present significant risks to NATO’s deterrence and readiness within 
the context of increasing Russian assertiveness, as displayed in the Crimea, Eastern 
Ukraine, Syria and other regions.13 Moreover, Young argues that the tendency of CEE 
states to hold onto static and localised Cold War-era territorial (conventional) defence 
capabilities and infrastructure, reduces their ability to be functional, integrated NATO 
allies in collective defence, which depends on rapid reaction and manoeuvre.14 These 
shortcomings in CEE military capabilities15 have created dependence on Western 
support and resources for deployability,16 and have become an unfunded liability for 
NATO on its most vulnerable side.17
Although Young writes mainly from an American perspective, this book is critical of 
the discreet and overenthusiastic Western approaches and expensive initiatives to assist 
CEE countries, without understanding the multiplicity and magnitude of challenges 
that these defence organisations have experienced following democratisation.18 Young 
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emphasises that the problem of a lack of reform can be understood only if the conceptual 
frameworks, political context, organisational culture and disincentives for change are 
understood and addressed.19 This presumes an internal realisation and steadfast political 
will within CEE states that they must change their old paradigms.
Young’s recommendations for more appropriate advice and assistance programmes 
are relevant to other countries that underwent democratic regime change. Firstly, he 
emphasises that all role players and stakeholders at national level with strategic partners 
have to delineate the unique realities and conceptual challenges they face honestly, and 
should direct defence reform as a political intervention throughout the entire hierarchy of 
defence organisations, and not just through easy military-to-military programmes. This 
requires fine diplomatic footwork and hands-on leadership between unequal defence 
partners to solve major tensions and turf wars to protect vested interests.20 Secondly, 
the inappropriateness of US defence planning models and tools for CEE states is was 
strongly criticised, and Young argues that each country should rather develop simple, 
tailored defence planning methods and tools, according to their unique needs. Thirdly, 
civil–military relations in CEE states had to be rebalanced following democratic regime 
change. To help address this, Young emphasises capacity building for defence ministries 
and civilian defence officials as a critical success factor for democratic institutional 
reform and enhanced defence policy and planning expertise.21 Fourthly, militaries in 
CEE states tend to develop unrealistic long-term visions and strategies, with pipedream 
force designs that are not costed and which cannot be afforded. Young recommends that, 
in the short and medium term, CEE militaries should rather build cohesive, operational 
units that can perform all their combat and support functions in the field during live 
exercises and operations. Lastly, he argues that defence budgets should be divided 
in thirds in terms of spending on personnel, capital projects and operating costs, as 
opposed to the ratio of 40:30:30 that is often prescribed. 
There are a few points of critique criticism. Firstly, while Western norms and 
defence concepts serve an important theoretical purpose to illustrate the shortcomings 
of CEE militaries, this book creates the impression that Western militaries do not at 
times struggle with similar problems as former communist militaries, albeit on a smaller 
scale and in a less fundamental way. For example, after the Vietnam War (1965–1973), 
the United States had a major civil–military gap and a ‘hollow’ military that had to be 
professionalised. History has shown that even Western countries sometimes have to 
revisit what has made militaries effective and efficient in the past, especially by studying 
from  so-called ‘paradigm armies’.22 Militaries can respond to change (or the need 
thereof) in several ways, varying from rebuilding deteriorated institutions to imitating 
and importing new ideas, introducing or adapting new ideas through innovation, or 
stagnation (stasis).23 Secondly, Young does not unpack the dilemmas and indecision of 
CEE states on whether they should focus on self-reliant territorial defence for national 
defence, or on NATO’s expeditionary capabilities. In other words, Young assumes that 
NATO’s approach is best for CEE states, but he does not substantiate it. Thirdly, the 
argument that Soviet-designed legacy military equipment forms part of the problem that 
CEE states cannot rid themselves of communist legacy concepts, is not fully explained. 
There are doctrinal and technical reasons that could have been explored in addition to the 
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conceptual and logistic arguments. This criticism is minor considering the thoroughness 
of the research and synthesis in this publication. 
The empirical depth and comparative theoretical value of the book are quite 
extensive, since the book is not only based on Young’s detailed multi-level research 
on the policies and strategies of CEE states, but also on his personal involvement in 
examining the influence of the above-mentioned typologies, as well as experience in 
trying to assist CEE governments with defence reforms.24 The overall conclusion of 
this book is that formerly undemocratic, highly centralised, communist-inspired and 
doctrinally inflexible defence organisations will face a long and difficult road towards 
implementing Western democratic defence reforms, which cannot succeed without 
politicians who vigorously steer and enforce defence organisations to change. This 
book is recommended for defence legislators, civilian officials within the defence and 
security community, defence planners, joint and service college staff and students, 
senior officers, and postgraduate students within the field of strategic studies. The 
above-mentioned defence challenges that CEE states face should ring a familiar bell 
to the South African defence community, which should also attentively read this book.
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